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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I, THE PROBLEM 
Sraremenr -- or the problem. The purpose of this pro- 
ject was to develop a resource unit for use in teaching the 
development of the United States international relations 
from the Spanish-American War to the entrance of the United 
States into World War I, This unit on international re- 
lations covers a four-week period in an eleventh-grade 
American hi story class. 
Justification of the resource unit, It was 
-- -
necessary to determine whether a resource w i t  on United 
States international relations from 1898 to 1917 would be 
of value in the teaching of history, In surveying curriculum 
and methods texts and professional periodicals, it m s  found 
that few units of work had been developed in this area. Al- 
so, there has been much recent research reported on the 
period from 1898 to 1914. It was therefore concluded that 
the preparation of this resource unit was a worthy project. 
One of the greatest problems facing the world today 
is that of establishing world order. Wishful thinking is 
not sufficient to achieve this result. Wise decisions about 
international relations and international agencies must be 
;L 
based upon an unders~anaing or the causes of wars and of the 
ways in which various types of national and international 
action have worked out in the past. The problem of preventing 
war is not an academic one for high school students, It is 
one which they recognize to be of the utmost importance for 
their own future, It is important, therefore, that each 
student have a good understanding of the United States basic 
foreign policy of the past so that he may understand and 
help shape American foreign policy of today. 
I PROCEDURE 
There are two generally accepted types of units to- 
aay. These are the resource unit, and the teaching unit. 1 
The resource unit usually differs from the teaching unit in 
several respects--in purpose, scope, inception, and organi- 
zation. 
The advantages of a resource w i t  over a teaching 
unit are: 
(1 ) It contains many more suggestions than can be 
used by any one class; (2) it covers a broad area 
from which materials can be drawn for the study of 
specific topics or problems; (3 )  it gives a number 
of possibilities for achieving the same objective; 
and (41  it is not organized as a classroom teaching 
guide, 
A resource unit encompasses a given area of learning, 
' ~ d ~ a r  Be Wesley and Stanley P. Wronski, Teachin 
~ Y ~ B ~ e * e  
4 Social Studies in Hi h Schools (Boston: D.C. Heat 
21, James Quil len and Lavons A. Hanna, Education - for 
(Chicago : Scott, Foresman, and Company, 
In it tnere are detailed listings 01 objectives, principles, 
procedures, methods, reference materials, and suggestions 
for evaluation. The scope of the resource unit is always 
more inclusive than that of the teaching unit. It is so 
extensive that the teacher is not expected to deal with all 
of its contents, nor utilize all of the suggested student 
activities. It should act as a guide for the teacher to 
make his own teaching unit with the information available 
in the resource unit, 
There are many ways to organize resource units but 
they all incorporate, in some form or another: (1) title, 
(2) subject matter content, and (3) teaching aids. 1 
A suggested way of organization is found in the 
textbook entitled Teaching Social Studies - in High School by 
Edgar B. Wesley and Stanley P, Wronski. The proposed con- 
tent is as follows: 
Title 
I, Overview of the unit 
11, ObJectives to be sought from the 
111. Contents of the unit 
IV. Unit procedures 
A. Initiatory activities 
B, Developmental activities 
C, Culminating activities 
V. Materials to be used 
A. Reading materials 
1. Bibliography for the teacher 
2, Bibliography for the students 
B. Audio-visual materials 
VI, Evaluating the unit 
A. In terms of obJectives 
B. Specific test and measuring ins ruments 
C. Informal evaluation techniques. i 
T l ~ e  organizarion 1.0llowed in the preparation of thl- 
uniz will be that presented above. 
Before attempting to write this resource unit, 
numerous high school history texts were surveyed. It was 
found that the treatment of the history of the development 
of United States international relations from the Spanish 
American War to the entrance of United States into World War 
I was inadequate as presented in these texts. This necessi- 
tated delving into college texts to develop a broader treat- 
ment of the subject. 
A broad general background was needed to familiarize 
LAN: author with the area to be covered. The four texts 
selected for the background materials were: Shaping - of 
American Diplomacy by Villian ~illians,' A - Diplomatic History 
of the United States by Samuel  erni is,^ A Diplomatic History 
-- - 
of the American People by Thomas ~ a i l e ~ , ~  and Documents of 
-- -
American History by Henry Commager. 4 
The main obJective in the writing of this unit was 
'willlam Appleman William, The Shapinq of American 
Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNal ly anmompany, 1=6? 
'barnuel Flagg Bcmis, A Di lomatic Histor of the + d t ~ , ~ c . ,  United States (New York: HOIT, ine art an 
m 
3~homas A. Bailey, A Di lomatic Histor of t&
American People (New York: -F* d p a n y ,  1946). 
4 ~ c n r y  Stee lc Connrmger, Documents of American History 
(New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1nc.,79m). 
to give the students a sufficient background of the major 
events in the diplomatic history of the United States during 
the years 1898 to 1917. To do this a number of high school 
texts were surveyed to see how the authors covered this area 
in the field of history. It was then decided to combine the 
good points of each of these texts into one complete and pre- 
cise unit. 
Organization of the resource unit. Chapter I1 of 
-- -
this report is the resource unit for the teaching of the 
development of United States international relations from 
the Spanish American War to the entrance of the United States 
into World War I. 
The organization of content is as follows: 
1 t le 
I. Overview of the unit 
11. ObJectives to be sought from the unit 
111. Contents of the unit 
IV. Unit procedures 
A. Initiatory activities 
B. Developmental activities 
C. Culminating activities 
V. Materials to be used 
A. Reading materials 
1. Bibliography for the teacher 
2. Bibliography for the students 
B. Audio-visual materials 
VI. Evaluating the unit 
A. In terms of objectives 
B. Specific test and measuring instruments 
C. Informal evaluation techniques. 
Overview --- of the unit. The purpose of the overview 
is to provide the teacher or student with a brief survey of 
t h e  total learning situation involved in the unlr. 
Objectives to be sought from the unit. A unit s h o u ~ u  -- --- 
nave a list of objectives or goals which the students can 
work for. It should serve as a guide to be followed by the 
teacher and student, It is what a teacher hopes to accomplish 
with a given resource unit, 
Contents of the unit. The content of the unit is a 
--- 
narrative presentation of the subject matter of the unit, 
Unit procedures, "Initiatory activitiesn are de- 
-
signed to motivate the student to study the unit. The 
general purpose of any initiatory activity is to launch the 
new unit in such a way as to enlist the utmost enthusiasm 
and intellectual curiosity of the student, 
"Developmental activities" serve to help achieve 
U,.,, objectives, provide variety in order to maintain in- 
terest and provide for individual difference~ in abilities 
and interests. 
As the unit draws to a close there is need for a 
"concluding activitiesn that tie together past understandings 
and give the students an opportunity to see the unity and 
coherence of the problem area they have investigated, Such 
culminating activities are intended to reinforce the students' 
past learning. They are planned and carried out on the basis 
of joint decisions by students and the teacher. 
Materials to be used. One of the most useful and 
--- 
practical sections of any resource unit is its listings of 
naterials, The busy classroom teacher cannot be expected 
;o know of all the possible types of materials available for 
lse and the sources from which they can be obtained, The 
well-prepared resource unit will give him leads and refer- 
ences, The materials section should contain written, audio, 
3nd visual resource materials for both the students and the 
teacher. 
Evaluating -- the unit. The evaluation of the unit 
should take into consideration the unit objectives: under- 
standings, skills and attitudes, A means for measuring 
each of these areas has to be developed. 
IHE RESOURCE UNll 
I . OVERVIEW OF THE UNIT 
It was planned for this unit to place emphasis on 
the high points of American diplomacy from the Spanish- 
American War of 1898 to the First World War in Europe of 
1914, with major emphasis placed on the reasons for United 
States entry into World War I in 1917, 
Upon every citizen there rests a solemn obligation 
to inform himself of the basic foreign policy of the past 
so that he may help shape American foreign policy of today-- 
his foreign policy--along constructive and farsighted lines. 
An outline of the material to be included in the 
proposed unit follows: 
1. American policy of imperialism 
A. The Cuban Affair 
B, Spanishkrican War 
C. The Philippines 
D. Power of public opinion 
11, United States influence in the western Hemisphere 
A, Monroe Doctrine 
B, Panama 
C, Agreement with Latin America 
111. The United States I n  Eastern arfaaa- 
A. China 
1. nOpen-do~r" 
2. Boxer revolt 
B. Agreements signed 
1. Four-Power Treaty 
2. Nine-Power Treaty 
i v .  United States and World War I 
A. Propaganda 
B. Economic reasons 
C. Close association with Great Britain 
D. Submarine warfare 
11. THE OBJECTIVES AND DESIRED OUTCOMES 
ObJectives. The study of this Unit should answer 
the following questions: 
1. lay was the United States involved in the Cuban 
situation of 18981 
2. What were the causes of the Spanish-American War? 
3. What effects did the Spanish-American War have on 
the United States? 
4. What were the United States' methods of imperialism? 
5. Whet were the United Statesf views towards Latin 
America? 
6, What was the United States1 position in Eastern 
affairs? 
10 
7. What events rorced the lrnited States into war with 
the Axis Powers? 
Understandinqs. The following understandings should 
develop from use of the unit: 
1. The very important role of public opinion in the 
formulation of American foreign policy. 
, There can be no enduring cooperation with other 
nations except by adJustment, uhich must be 
lutua 1 
r i l e  forces ~ n a t  end to cause wars can be combatted 
successfully only if all nations will plan'and 
work cooperatively towards peace, 
a ,  In the formative years of the United States, the 
nation was so weak that involvement in European 
affairs would have been courting suicide. 
Attitudes. The attitudes listed as follows would be 
desired outcomes from use of the unit: 
1. A desire to live at peace with other nations and the 
determination to make a' world organitat ion succeed. 
2. A willingness on the part of the people of the 
United States to study and understand why others, 
whose lives are different, think as they do, 
3. The development of interests which will carry over 
to adult lives. 
11 
4. The development 01 more tolci-~IIGE, by realizing 
.hat in complicated international situations, 
one side has never had a complete monopoly of 
what seems to be right. 
111. CONTENT 
-1'he following information would be included in the 
content of the unit, 
American Policy ur Imperialism, The word imperialism 
zarries the suggestion that force is employed both in 
establishing and maintaining domination over new areas. For 
this study of imperialism the United States in South America 
# i l l  receive major study. It must be remembered that not 
only was the United States acting as an imperialistic power 
but other countries in Europe also were interested in overseas 
expansion in the Nineteenth Century. 
For more than a century the United States had followed 
a policy of isolation. This policy was shattered with start- 
ling suddenness by the Spanish-American War. The war grew 
out of American interest in Cuba. 
In the summer and autumn of 1895, when the American 
public was being deeply aroused against Great Britain over 
the Venezuela boundary dispute, relations with Spain over 
the situation in Cuba were rapidly deteriorating. In 
February, 1895, the Cubans raised the standard of revolt 
12 
after seventeen years of uppressive peace. TWO or the 
-easons were: (1) The harsh and inefficient Spanish rule; 
(2) The tariff legislation of the United States, 
*he Spanish were strict military rulers who collected 
nigh taxes and ruled with an iron hand over the people of 
:uba. The Spanish also ran the Cuban government. The people 
)f Cuba wanted to have a voice in their government because 
the Spanish collected taxes and most of the tax money was 
lsed in Spain, and little, if any, used in Cuba. 1 
The Ivilson-Gorman Tariff (1894) placed a duty on 
raw sugar, greatly reduced the American market, and brought 
ruin on the expanded cane plantations and industries of Cuba, 
rhis  caused great suffering to the mass of Cubans because 
most of them were laborers on the cane plantations, Many 
Americans were plantation owners, 
The Cuban insurrectionists under the leadership of 
Maxima Gamex revived the guerrilla warfare. They slaughtered 
Spanish loyalists and destroyed cane fields, syrup mills and 
machinery. The actions were mostly against the Spanish but 
much American property was destroyed as well. The Spanish 
government sent General Valeriana Wcy1e-r and a large military 
force to Cuba, with a free hand to deal with the rebels, 
l ~ r n n k  Lawrence Owsley, Oliver Perry Chitwood and 
H.C. Nixon, A Short Histor of the American People ( N ~ W  York: 
-5TT',TT D, Van ~ o s t r g n d p a n y  
13 
Weyler ran a barbea wire entanglement across the eastern 
part of the island, in an effort to confine the insurrection- 
ists to that area. This was more like a German concentration 
camp. This area was in a sweltering jungle, where the popu- 
lation was herded. Untold numbers died from disease, star- 
vation and brutal treatment by the Spanish soldiers.' m i l e  
the government of the United States was neutral, the American 
people were openly sympathetic with the Cuban revolutionists, 
Some of the reasons for this were: 
The Yellow Press, led by Hearst ls New York Journal, 
--
spread the stories of Weylerls brutalities, rfth 
exaggeration. 
2.  The Cubans wanted their independence and asked the 
United States to help. 
. The battleship kine, on a "friendlyw visit at 
Havana was blown up. One hundred fifty men were 
killed and sixty inJured. The United States pub- 
lic blamed Spain for it, although never proven. 
4. DeLome, the Spanish ambassador to the United States, 
wrote to a friend in Cuba that McKinley was a weak 
spineless politician, a "bidder for the admiration 
of the crowd.n This DeLome letter was published 
in newspapers in the United States. 
14 
War was declared on Spain. One of the main reasons 
was tnat the American public demanded it. This reason is 
emphasized in the book, The Man in the Street, by Thomas 
---.- 
~aile~.' This book deals with the power of public opinion 
and its force, which is very great in a democratic govern- 
oent like that of the United States. In the war with Spain 
the hostilities were short and highly successful, despite 
the serious blunder made by the United States government in 
the conduct of the war. 
The brunt of the war fell on the navy, which was well 
prepared for the emergency. It was the first test of the 
new steel navy, construction of which had been going forward 
since 1883. The first blow for Cnban independence was struck 
in the far-distant Philippines. Commodore Dewey's squadron, 
which was in Asiatic waters as a result of Assistant Secretary 
rheodore Roosevelt 's efforts, steamed from Hong Kong to 
Manila and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Dewey 
was compelled to wait from May 1 until August 13fm reinforce- 
ments which enabled the American troops to capture the city 
of Manila. Meanwhile, Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley 
had established an effective blockade of all Cnban posts. 
There they trapped Admiral Cervera and his Spanish fleet in 
lThomns Bailey, The Nan -- in the Street (New York: 
The h c m i  1 Ian Company, I=), 
15 
the Santiago narDor. This harbor was narrow ana united 
States ships could not go in after them for fear of being 
sunk. However, the Spanish fleet was very weak compared to 
the United States fleet. 
The campaign against Santiago was brief and decisive. 
Its two phases were: (1) the operations of the American 
expedition forces to the north and east of the city, and 
(2) the destruction of Cervera's fleet. 1 
On June 14, 1889, seventeen thousand troops under 
the command of General W.R. Shafter embarked at Tampa, Florida. 
Mithin three weeks General J.F. Kent's division had taken San 
Juan Hill, General H.W. Lawton's division had reached El 
Caney, and General Wheeler's cavalry, with the Rough Riders, 
had stormed Kettle Hill. Admiral Cervera, learning that the 
Americans controlled the heights above Santiago, made a 
desperate effort to escape. His entire fleet was destroyed, 
with the American casualties of one killed and sixteen 
wounded. On July 17 Santiago surrendered. A peace treaty 
was then signed. The chief clauses of the treaty which was 
finally signed on December 10 ar e :  (1) the grant of Cuban 
independence and assumption of the Cuban debt by Spain; ( 2 )  
the cession to the United S t a t 6 ~  of Puerto Rice, Guam and 
the Philippinas; ( 3 )  the payment of the United States of 
l ~ e o n  H. Canfield and Howard 8. wilder, The -Making 
of Modern America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, lo%), p , r  
$~0,000,000 for tne rnilippines. 1 
President McKinley encountered great difficulty in 
persuading the Senate to ratify the treaty. 
As a consequence of its war with Spain the United 
itates began to play a more vigorous part upon the world 
;tage than at any previous period in its history. The United 
itates issued the Platt Amendment to Cuba, which was as 
follows: 
1. Cuba ,,,,uld nevlsl- ~ ~ ~ t e r  into any treaty or agreement 
with a foreign power that impaired or tended to 
impair its independence. 
2. The Cuban government should contract no debt beyond 
the capacity of the ordinary reserves to pay. 
3. The United States was empowered to intervene to 
preserve Cuban independence and to nmintain a 
government that could preserve order. 
4. Cuba was to sell or lease to the United States sites 
for necessary coaling stations and naval bases. 2 
The Spanish-American War left the United States with 
the problems of organization and ruling the territories 
surrendered by Spain. The United States had promised these 
provinces their independence but the United States felt that 
l~illiam Faulkner, American Political and Social 
York: Appleton Century Crofts, I=,= 
17 
these people were nor ready to rule themselves. The United 
tates did much to improve the conditions of Cuba. The sick 
and the hungry were cared for, streets were cleaned and sewers 
constructed, schools were established, and public finances 
ere put on a sound basis, 
President McKinley sent a commission to the Philip- 
pines to study conditions there and render a report uhich 
auld aid in establishing a civil government in the Islands, 
acob Go Schurman was to head the commission, 
When Schurman arrived in the Philippines, he found 
the Filipinos in arms against the United States. Againaldo, 
whom Dewey had helped to get back to the Philippines from 
is exile in Asia for the purpose of fighting the Spaniards, 
had raised the standard of revolt against the Americans on 
February 4, 1899. To him and to most of the Filipinos, 
merican rule was no more acceptable than Spanish rule, 
The most severe test of American colonial policy and 
admini stration has been made in the Philippine Islands, The 
J a m s  Act and the liberal administration of Francis B, 
Harrison (1912-1921) gave impetus to the demand for immediate 
independence. hwpite the report of the Wood-Forbes Commission 
(1921) and the Thompson Committee (1926) that the Islands were 
not ready for self-government, the agitation for independence 
continued both in the islands and in the United States. Those 
who opposed control by the United States on the ground that 
liberty was being denied to the Filipinos were Joined by 
18 
o~nex-s who argues tnat American financial investment in the 
sland had been disappointing, that duty-free sugar from the 
Philippines was competing with American grown sugar on an 
unfair basis, that the islands had not enabled the United 
itates to increase its trade with the Orient, and that they 
constituted a liability rather than an asset from the stand- 
point of national defence, 1 
United States influence -- in the Western Hemisphere, 
The attitude of the South American neighbors can be traced 
)ack to events that have taken place in history relating to 
Jnited States and South America, 
In the Clayton Bulwer Treaty (1850) the United States 
?ad agreed that any Isthmian canal should be under the joint 
luarantee of Great Britain and the United States, In the 
second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, it was provided that the United 
States might build the canal and have full control and 
policing of it if its use was accorded to all nations on 
equal terms, 2 
The treaty above and the Hay-Herran Treaty of 1903 
dealt with the United States and Panama, Congress had de- 
cided to build the canal across Panama, rather than across 
Nicaragua, and had offered the new Canal Company 
19 
$40,000,000 for the rignts or the old French Company which 
had tried to construct a canal during the eighties. The 
Hay-Herran Treaty with Columbia was signed whereby Columbia 
granted the United States a ninety-nine year lease over a 
zone six miles wide in the province of Panama in return for 
$10,000,000 in cash and an annual rental of $250,000 be- 
ginning nine years after the agreement was ratified, The 
Columbia Senate, much to the disgust of President Roosevelt, 
refused to ratify the treaty, probably hoping to get better 
terms, 
Columbia's reJection of the Hay-Herran Treaty not 
,..,, irritated the United States government, but it alarmed 
those who were interested in the new Panama Canal Company 
and it aroused patriotic Panamanians who feared the canal 
would be built in Nicaragua. In the summer of 1903 it was 
no surprise to American government when the revolution was 
started in Panama. The revolutionists were successful be- 
cause the United States, basing its action on a treaty of 
1846 with Columbia, maintained free and uninterrupted transit 
across the Isthmus. Actually, this action prevented the 
Columbian government from moving the necessary troops to 
quell the revolt. 1 
Two weeks after the revolution the United States 
cwncluded a WlZn t ne republic of Panam, the Hay- 
unau Varilla (1903). President Theodore Roosevelt 
mmediatel~ recognized the new Republic of Panam. The new 
greement granted to the United States in perpetuity the use 
of the canal zone ten miles wide, transferred to the United 
states government the properties of New Panama Canal Company 
nd the Panama Railroad Company; awarded Panama $10,000,000 
and an annuity of $250,000 for its concessions. After 
several false starts the construction of the canal went for- 
,ard rapidly under the supervision of Colonel G.W. Gothals. 
Colonel W.C. Gorgas conquered the difficulties of sanitation 
in the Canal Zone. The first steamer passed through the 
anal in August, 1914. 
Great Britain and Germany, endeavoring to collect 
debts owed to their citizens by the government of Venezuela, 
stablished a blockade of Venezuelan ports. President 
noosevelt feared that the debt question might be made the 
pretext for a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. His di- 
plomatic pressure behind the scenes, particularly against 
Germany, probably helped both nations to decide to agree to 
arbitratfon. Mixed commi~si0nS reviewed the claims against 
the south American republic and Venezuela agreed in 1903 
to devote thirty per cent of its customs receipts to P ~ Y  the 
valid claims,  he Venezuelan incident was the occasion for 
the pronouncement by Luis Drago, Argentine minister for 
21 
foreign affairs, of the doctrine that no state has a right 
.o make the pecuniary claims of its citizens against another 
state the pretext for military intervention. The United 
States State Department gave its support to the Drago Doc- 
.rine and at the Second Hague Conference, 1907, the United 
itates delegation secured the adoption of a resolution that 
10 nation should resort to armed force to recover the debts 
due its citizens unless the debtor nation refused arbitration, 
,r having accepted arbitration, failed to yield to the 
iecision. 
V.'hen France, Italy, and Belgium threatened in 1904 
~ , o  use force in collecting debts owed their citizens by the 
lominican Republ ic, President Theodore Roosevelt announced 
that the United States would be compelled to intervene in 
the affairs of a neighbor republic in case of long-continued 
rrongdoing or failure to pay debts. Under this corollary 
of the Monroe Doctrine the administration negotiated a 
treaty with the Dominican Republic providing for control of 
the collection of the Dominican customs by the United States. 
When the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, Roosevelt put 
the receivership into effect by executive order. This mani- 
n festation of our police powern was widely criticized in 
the United States and aroused grave apprehension throughout 
Latin America. 1 
22 
The United Stares in Eastern affairs. The years - -
which followed the Spanish-American War found the interest 
and the Power of the United States expanding in the Far East 
as well as in the Western Hemisphere. Annexation of the 
Philippine Islands had a great effect upon United States 
Far Eastern policy. As can be seen, one of the convincing 
3rguments in favor of annexing the Philippines had been the 
nearness of the island to China and their advantage as a 
springboard for the development of trade with China. The 
United States soon found, however, that other countries were 
determined to get this trade for themselves. They were even 
trying to bring about the partition of China for their own 
benefit. Possession of the Philippines also affected the 
United States relations with Japan. It was apparent that 
there would be difficulty in defending the Philippines if 
the United States became involved in any Far Eastern conflict. 
A vast empire covering a territory as large as the 
whole of Europe--China--was ruled by the hkncha Dynasty. The 
domination of the Manchu emperors was, however, somewhat 
shadowy. For all purposes of administration the heads of 
the eighteen provinces into vhich the country was divided 
were largely independent, Thus China was militarily weak. 
The Chinese did not want foreigners in their country. They 
believed that their civilization was infinitely superior to 
that of the Occident and wished to preserve it against outside 
23 
influences. To keep foreigners out of the country the gov- 
rnment had restricted foreign trade to the port of Canton. 
The Chinese lacked the military force to resist 
roreign encroachments. Consequently they were compelled to 
pen more and more ports to foreign trade. The first ports 
rere opened as a result of the Opium War. In addition to 
:otton, which was the principal article of trade with China, 
the British East India Company was selling in Canton con- 
siderable quantities of opium, a product of India which 
yielded large profits. For many years the Chinese took no 
.ction, but when the opium trade grew to such proportions 
.hat it caused widespread demoralization, Chinese officials 
.ried to stop the importation of the drug. After various 
other measures had failed, the Chinese Imperial Commissioner 
in 1839 confiscated the opium held by some British merchants 
rho at once called on the British government to avenge the 
insult to the British flag. The British fleet responded by 
smashing the forts at the entrance to the Canton River and 
British troops took possession of Canton and other maritime 
cities. 
The Opium War was concluded by the treaty of Nanking, 
1842, in which the Chinese governmnt agreed to pay the 
British a large indemnity, cede the island of Hongkong to 
them, and open four additional ports to trade. France, 
Spain, &lgium, the Netherlands, and also the United States 
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i¶uickly signed treacles giving them the same comercia1 
rights* concessions did not satisfy the European 
nations and the United States very long, In 1843 the British 
signed a comnercia1 treaty which extended their privileges 
b y  setting land aside for their residence. A short time 
later both the United States and France, by a small display 
of force, secured similar advantages. These treaties mark 
the beginning of "the right of extraterritoriality". the 
right which gave foreigners immunity from Chinese juris- 
diction. Thereafter the provision was incorporated in the 
treaties which all the western nations signed with China. 
Consequently no foreigner residing in China was subject to 
Chinese laws as regards either his person or his property, 
Any charge or claim against him had to be presented before 
the consul of his own country and was judged according to 
the laws of his nation. For a time efforts had been re- 
stricted to obtaining commercial and extraterritorial rights, 
During the succeeding decades various western Powers Pro- 
ceeded to establish their domination over large sections of 
Chinese territory. 
Through the conpest of Cochin China, Cambodia, 
Tonkin, and Annam, the French virtually laid claim to sou- 
thern China, The British also extended their control 
compelling China to recognize British sovereignty over Burm 
in 1886. Even the Japanese, encourwed by the example of the 
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western forced China in the treaty which ended the 
Sf*o-Japanese War to turn Over to her the Liatung Peninsula 
together wi th Port Arthur, acknowledge the independence of 
Korea, and surrender to Japan the island of Formosa, But the 
Russians, seeing in the presence of the Japanese on the 
Asiatic mainland an obstacle in their plans, compelled them 
by a threat of force and with the support of France and 
England to relinquish their claims, Thus, before the end of 
the nineteenth century the Chinese found themselves with 
their best ports leased to foreign nations and their coastal 
?d inland trade controlled by foreigners, I 
Alarmed by the actlvity of the European powers in 
establishing "spheres of inf lnencen in China, Secretary Hay 
requested Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and 
Japan to agree to the principle of the "open door." His 
proposals included: (1) Noninterference ai th the taenty- 
two treaty ports in China; (2) Universal application of 
the Chinese tariff and harbor dues within any given Rs~heren 
for merchants of all nations, The European Pomrs reluctantly 
agreed to Hays' principle of equality of o ~ ~ o r t n n i t ~  in China 
in commercial matters, thus insuring to American traders 
equality of treatrwnt with the nationals of the countries 
which had received concessi0nS from the Chinese governmnt. 
lergang, 2. G., FP. z66-2690 
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The protection of the territorial integrity of China was 
ncidental. The Boxer Rebellion, 1900, was the result of 
,-esentment of the Chinese against the commercial and financial 
exploitation of their country by foreigners. It resulted in 
n attack upon the foreign settlement in Peking by an anti- 
Dreign society known as the Boxers. 
At Secretary Hay's insistence an international relief 
force was organized which fought its way to Peking in time to 
save the majority of those beseiged in the legations. The 
United States assumed the lead in determining the punishment 
to be imposed upon China for the Boxer outrages, and succeeded 
in restraining those nations which desired to wreak vengeance 
upon the Celestial Empire. Again Hay demonstrated the extent 
f' American interest and influence in world affairs. 
In their search for lucrative trade connections, the 
western powers did not overlook Japan. But when they sought 
entry into that country they found the door tightly locked. 
A small but informed Japanese minority realized that their 
country, if it wished to escape domination by the western 
powers, must adopt the political, military, and economic 
systems of the west. The first major step was toward cen- 
tralization of authority. The next steps were the end of 
feudalism, a new educational system, railroad construction, 
military reform, and a strong navy. 
The Japanese developed an a r v  aided by a combination 
of French and British military experts. The Japanese made a 
27 
treaty with Britain to keep tnem out of the Russo-Japanese 
ar. Then, without making a declaration of war, they launched 
a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, 
February 8, 1904, and inflicted much damage. This time the 
orld took the Japanese more seriously, but the general 
opinion was that an Asiatic people would stand little chance 
of victory in a war against Western military forces. However, 
he unprepared Russians were anything but a match for the 
apanese. After bottling the Russian fleet up in the ports 
f Port Arthur and Vladivostok, they destroyed it bit by bit 
whenever ships ventured out into the open. On land the 
Japanese were equally successful against the ill-equipped 
ussian troops. While one army quickly drove the Russians 
out of Korea, another landed behind Port Arthur to keep 
supplies from reaching the main Russian army in Manchuria. 
The last of the great battles lasted from February 23 to 
March 16, 1905, and ended in a Russian defeat. Still the 
Russians did not make overtures for peace. 
Finally, President Theodore Roosevelt, to prevent 
further bloodshed, requested the belligerent nations to send 
plenipotent iar ies to a peace conference at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire. In the treaty signed September 5, 1905, Russia 
agreed to transfer to Japan the lease on the Liaotung Penin- 
sula and Port Arthur and to cede to Japan the southern half 
of Sakhalin Island. No indemnity was paid by either side. 
The failure of Theodore Roosevelt to obtain indemnity from 
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Russia for Japan caused the Japanese to have ill-feeling 
 ward the United States. 1 
World War 1, which began in August, 1914, played 
directly into the hands of the Japanese imperalists. Japan 
mediately took advantage of the fact that Germany was un- 
ble to defend her possessions in the Far East. Before the 
nd of 1914 she had taken not only Kiaochow, which China had 
leased to Germany, but also the German-held islands north 
nf the Equator. Also taking advantage of the fact that the 
ther European powers had to give their attention to the war, 
Japan presented China, in 1915, with the so-called Twenty- 
one Demands (for special privileges). The Twenty-one Demands 
ere intended to close the Open Daor and to make Japan supreme 
in China. Japanese policies of aggression alarmed the United 
States. Secretary of State Bryan bluntly notified Japan and 
hina that the United States "cannot recognize any agreement 
or undertaking which impairs the treaty rights of the United 
States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial 
integrity of the Republic of China, or the international 
policy relative to China commonly known as the open door 
policy. n 2  As a result of the United States protests, Japan 
pave up the extreme demands she had made on China. This 
policy helped to bring about Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. 
'1bid pa p pp. 270-275. 
k a n f  ield, pp. 586-586. 
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Unlrea btates and VJorld War I. The shot that felled 
- - - -  
the *rchduke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, 
created only a flurry of excitement in the United States, 
Americamhad heard the cry of "wolfn too often to believe 
hat the Pack Was loose at last. But when it finally became 
evident that Europe was being d r a m  into m r ,  the first re- 
action of the United States was to keep out of the senseless 
onf 1ict.l "peace-loving citizens of this country will rise 
up and tender a hearty vote of thanks to Columbus for having 
discovered A m e r i ~ a , ~  declared the Chicago Herald. The Wabash 
lain Dealer chimed in, "We never appreciated so keenly as 
-
ow the foresight exercised by our forefathers in emigrating 
rom Europe." The Literary Digest summed up newspaper re- 
action: "Cur isolated position and freedom from entangling 
alliances inspire our press with the cheering assurance that 
'e are in no peril of being drawn into the European quarrel. n 2  
August 4, 1914, President Wilson issued a proclamation 
of neutrality. He cautioned citizens to commit no act to aid 
either side of the controversy. He declared the ports closed 
to belligerent warships, unless they came for assistance, in 
which they were to leave in twenty-four hours and receive 
lArthur Bullard of the Great War (New York: 
Macmi l lan Company, 19171, 
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coal and supplies only sufficient to take them to their 
earest home ports. He also reminded the people that while 
hey had the right to sell contraband articles to a belligerent, 
uch articles were subject to seizure if intercepted at sea. 1 
The people of the United States could not be indiffer- 
LV the course of events in Europe, A hundred motives 
orced them to take sides--their neutral rights, their sym- 
pathies, their prejudices, indignation over the brutal in- 
-.asion of Belgium, hatred of England, good will towards 
ngland, grateful remembrance for French support in the War 
I-or Independence, ties of blood, nationality, 
No sooner was the war fairly under way than Germans, 
erman-Americans and pro-German citizens began the most 
remarkable propaganda ever made by a belligerent and its 
supporters to influence opinion in a neutral country. The 
ress, the platform, and the mails were used without re- 
striction. 2 
The German propaganda in America devoted itself to 
a blackening of the fame of England and to a unification of 
the Germans in the United States, In the United States in 
1910 there were 8,712,149 people either born in Germany or 
l ~ e n r ~  Steele Connnager, Documents of American Histor 
(New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1nc.,793~), p. 2 E+ 
2~rederic L. Paxson, Recent Histor of the United + States ( N ~ W  York: Houghton NTTITK o m p a n y , ~ 9 ~ , P P ; 3 6 -  
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wlrn One parent born there. Slnce the visit of Prince Henry 
f' Prussia and the formation of the National German-American 
nlliance in 1902, the organization of this group had been 
ti ghtened and extended. The Father land, a German newspaper, 
ktem~ted to stress the anti-British feeling of the Americans 
uf Irish extraction, who, since the Fenian movement, had 
consistently opposed acts of agreement with Great Britain and 
who were already partially organized in the American Truth 
S ~ c i e t y  to fight the rapprochement due to the termination of 
hundred years of ~eace.' Most of the German propaganda 
came through the German Arnbassadorls office and it was not 
in any degree as well distributed in the United States as 
le A1 1 ied propaganda. 2 
).!any American newspapers were in favor of the Allies' 
cause, so war tales of atrocities began to make the headlines. 
!adlines related the facts: Malines and Thermonde were 
Durned; Louvain was sacked; its precious old library was 
destroyed by a people who for a century had called themselves 
the most devoted friends of scholarship; and the burgomaster 
and other leading citizens of Aerschot were executed because, 
it was reported, the burgomaster's Son had resented the insult 
a drunken German officer offered to the burgomaster's daughter* 
lJohn Bach Mchkster, The United States in the P!orld 
War - (New York: D. Appleton a ~ ~ o r n p a n ~ , ~ , ~ p 2 3 ~  
2 ~ o h n  Sperner Bassett, Our War With Germany ( ~ e w  
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1918), p. 14. 
,umber of people and destroying sixty houses. Shortly after- 
dards, a single aviator flew over Paris dropping bombs. On 
September 21 the newspapers told about the bombardment of 
:heims, and day after day continued the story until it was not 
roo much to say that the American people were able to see 
this magnificent work of art hacked to pieces bit by bit.l 
Many historians and writers at that time and now be- 
that because of economic reasons the United States 
ntered the war on the side of the Allies. To clarify this, 
Rose M. Stein in her book entitled-M-Day relates: 
By a series of successive steps American business 
forced the country to enter the World War. The die 
was cast when on the first day of August, 1914, all 
the partners of J.P. Morgan and Co. were heart and 
soul for the Allies. The first step was acquiescence 
to the blockade and acceptance of the proposition to 
sell to only one of the belligerents. The next step 
was to ratify loans with which to pay for American 
goods delirerod to the Allies. The final step was 
taken to save the loans and consequent collapse of 
American and world credit. Each step was taken by 
the Government reluctantly but was forced upon it as 
a condition for main aining productive activity and 
economic prosperity. h 
German submarine warfare was the immediate cause for 
American entry into the war, but American banks first forced 
the American government to authorize large loans to Francs 
ZRosc M. stein, &Day (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 19361, P o  2 .  
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and tireat Britain. When tnose countries were faced with de- 
feat, the American government was forced to enter to protect 
the bankers1 investments. The high prices for food products 
brought great prosperity to the farmers, while the purchasers 
of war munitions stimulated industry and set factories going 
to full capacity.l 
The estimated excess of American exports over imports 
for the entire year was $2,500,000,000 and the figure from 
December 1, 1914, to June 30, 1915, was only slightly less 
than $1,000,000,000.2 It was felt that if European countries 
could not find the means to pay for the excess of goods sold 
them over those purchased from them they would have to stop 
buying and the export trade would shrink proportionately. 
The probable result would be restriction of output, indus- 
trial depression, idle capital, idle labor, numerous failures, 
financial demoralization, and general unrest and suffering 
arnonp the laboring classes. The above reasons, his torfans 
state, were the reasons the United States loaned large sums 
of money to France and England, and shipped them large amounts 
of goods. Also the fact remains that Americans were economic- 
ally dependent on trade with the Allies to maintain economic 
prosperity. 
l ~ ~ l l f a r n  Applcrnan Iilliarns, The Shaping of American 
Di lomac (Chicago: Rand HcNal ly anmompany, 1m6-60- &-- 
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Americans coula not help taking siaes. From the 
f.lrst the hoped the Allies would win. Cultural ties 
between the United States, Great Britain, and France were 
strong. were the three great democracies. All three 
a d  similar ideals of Justice, liberty, and the rights of 
the individual. All three stood for the peaceful settlement 
of international disputes. The Central Powers, on the 
ontrary, were autocracies, Their rulers resisted their 
people's efforts to gain self-government and oppressed the 
minority groups within their borders. Germany had aroused 
istrust by its ambitions in China, the East Indies, the 
racif ic, and Africa. Leaders of the Pan-German movement 
boasted that Germans were destined to dominate the world, As 
he war went on, more and more Americans felt that the cause 
"f Rritain and France was their cause too. Thousands of 
Americans enlisted under the British and French flags. 
Hundreds of thousands contributed to Allied war relief. On 
the other hand, there were nearly nine million Americans of 
German birth or parentage, and they tended to support their 
fatherland. In addition, many Americans of Irish descent 
were ready to cheer any foe of their ancient enemy, the 
Eritishm Both sides tried to influence American opinion by 
means of propaganda, as was stated earlier in this paper. 
The Allies were far more effective in smying '.Inericans than 
were the Central P o ~ r s .  This was partly due to British 
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conrrol the which carrlea news from Europe. Even 
ore was the widespread sympathy here with the 
.llied cause. succeeds best when people want to 
elieve it. 1 
Sympathy in this country for the Allied cause did 
ILVL, rluwever, prevent friction from arising between the 
British and American governments. The Allies were resolved 
0 use their naval superiority to prevent the Central Powers 
rom receiving outside supplies. The German navy was in 
ontrol of the Baltic Sea and Germany therefore could carry 
on trade with the Scandinavian countries as well as with 
Holland and Denmark. Since these neutral countries served 
s backdoors for the admission of foreign goods into Germany, 
England could not carry out an effective blockade. She 
determined, however, to bring about the same result by other 
eans. In so doing she adopted policies which the American 
government considered a violation of international law and 
an infringement of neutral rights. 2 
One such practice was the extension of the list of 
contraband articles beyond what, in American opinion, was 
allowed by international law. Among the unusual articles in 
this list were food products, which had been included for the 
 alter Phelp~ Hall and Robert Greenhalgh Albion, A_ 
Histor of En land and the British Empire (New York: Ginn d p z i i h  , Tm. 
pp. 6-7. 
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alleges reason that the German government had taken over all 
lain and flour for distribution among civilians and service- 
men. It was therefore impossible for the Allies to make a 
distinction between the food supplies intended for the 
vilian population and those that would go to the army. 1 
The seizure of contraband goods did not, however, 
stop the indirect trade with Germany through the adjacent 
utral countries. American exports to Denmark, Holland, 
Norway and Sweden were increasing by leaps and bounds and 
the excess over normal times was going to Germany. To put a 
stop to this trade the Allied governments announced in March, 
1915, that thereafter they would "detain and take into port 
ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, 
origin. ti2 
All ships bound for countries adJoining Germany were 
searched and all cargoes seized which in the opinion of the 
inspectors would ultimately reach Germany, even though they 
were to be landed first at a neutral port. The countries ad- 
jacent to Germany were allowed a quota of imports equal to 
the amount received by them before the war. All amounts in 
excess of this quota were considered as going to Germany and 
were diverted to the Allies. This plan of rationing the 
northern neutrals was giving the doctrine of final destination 
37 
an u~ryl-c~cdented extens ion. This blockade of neutral ports 
t with strong objection from the United States and other 
neutrals. The United States contended that the methods em- 
ployed by the in carrying out their policies were not 
in with international Usage. Objection also made 
to the allied Practice of opening American letters going to 
continental Europe, on the ground of preventing helpful in- 
formation from reaching Germany from America, 1 
The Allies attempted to justify their restraints on 
neutral commerce partly on the ground that they were in 
keeping with the spirit of international law and partly on 
the around that they were measures in reprisal for Germanyts 
violation of international law. These explanations were not 
acce~ted by neutrals as satisfactory reasons. The Amrican 
State Llepartment obJected to these violations of neutral 
ahts but did not in its op~osition ao beyond protests, which 
were filed only to serve as legal claims for damages at the 
end of the war. If it had resorted to economic pressure it 
could have brouqht England to terms. An embargo on arms and 
other materials needed by the Allies could have forced 
England to yield to the American government's demands. How- 
ever, if President Wilson had employed this method of 
peaceable coercion he would have crippled the 
the A1 lies and helped the Central Powers towards a possible 
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victory. To Wilson, Lansing, and the other leading officials 
t Washington, such a victory would have been a calamity for 
he United States as well as a disaster to Europe. In their 
pinion the future prosperity and security of this country 
were bound up with the success of the Allied cause. Further- 
-ore, an embargo would have worked a greater injury to 
merican commerce than that caused by the Allied restrictions. 1 
The British authorities carried out the objectionable 
nolicy in such a way as to cause as little loss to individuals 
s possible. American ship-owners also soon learned how to 
adjust their plans to the Allied regulations without any great 
inconvenience. Also, the loss of the German market was more 
han compensated for by the increased demand of the Allies 
for American products. The ready sale of American goods at 
hiqh prices in Allied markets was sustaining a marvelous 
prosperity in America. It could hardly be expected that the 
government would jeopardize this prosperity by going the 
limit in insisting on rights which at the tine were academic 
rather than practical. In actual practice the Allied policy 
was hurting the pride more than the profits of the American 
people. 2 
Despite the patient restraint shown by the State 
'1bid -* pp. 548-549. 
'~ailc~, E. G., PP. 616-619. 
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Deparrmenr, at times relations DeCame tense between the 
united States and the Allies. The ill feeling growing out 
of this friction was cumulative, and by the fall of 1916 
public sentiment in the United States was veering away from 
the Allies. Even Wilson's patience was wearing thin. He 
had been disappointed over the refusal of the Allies to give 
favorable consideration to his peace offer, made in February 
of that year. Wilson's desire to act as peacemaker was now 
inspired by the wish to stop the bloodshed in Europe and 
also by the longing to spare his own country the horrors of 
war. In February, 1916, he proposed to the British foreign 
office that a conference be held to agree upon terms of 
peace. If Britain should agree to the proposal and Germany 
would not, the United States, he said, would probably leave 
the conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies. 
\'.'hi le the terms of peace would have to be agreed upon be- 
tween the be1 1 iaerents at the conference, Colonel House 
indicated that his government would support a settlement 
favorable to the Allies. Unfortunately, however, neither 
side was willing to accept peace without victory. Germany 
would not consider any terms which did not provide for in- 
demnities. Britain did not even submit the proposal to her 
ally, l It caused lllilton to question whether the Allies were 
not as selfish as the Central Powers in their war aims. This 
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feeling of disa~~olntment wa, ac,en,uatea by the ~ l l i ~ d  
nnOuncement in 1916, of a blacklist which included 
ighty-five American establishments. All firms on this 
lacklist were denied the privilege of trade with firms in 
Allied countries. 
During t L  
~r-at six rnon~hs of the war the United 
tates was involved in virtually no serious difficulties with 
Germany. It is a fact that these two nations were then con- 
tending with Great Britain for the freedom of the seas. Bat 
he mounting trade in war materials brought about a change, 
The Americans were not only shipping enormous quantities of 
munitions to the Allies with which to kill Germans, but were 
oon to advance the necessary money from their own pockets, 
The chief German propaganda newspaper in the United States 
cried: "We prattle about humanity, while we manufacture 
oisoned shrapnel and picric acid for profit. Ten thousand 
tierman widows, ten thousand orphans, ten thousand graves 
bear the legend 'made in ~merica'."' 
The American controversy with Germany began on 
February 4, 1915, at which time the German government issued 
a proclamation declaring the Waters around the British Isles 
a war zone, ~ 1 1  enemy ships found in this zone on and after 
February 18, 1915, were to be destroyed its being 
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always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews 
nd Passengers on that account. The proclamation went on 
0 say that even neutral ships vmuld be exposed to danger 
n the war zone as in view of the misuse of neutral flags 
~ r d e r e d  on January 1st by the British government and of the 
accidents of naval war. It cannot always be avoided to 
trike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at 
enemy ships.' Neutral powers were accordingly forewarned 
not to continue to entrust their crews, passengers, or mer- 
handise to such vessels. In short, this was a warning that 
,,eutrals would run a serious risk of losing their lives and 
their ships if they would venture into the war zone. The 
xcuse given for this defiance of international law was that 
it was a retaliatory measure necessitated by Britain's 
restrictions on German trade. Great Britain had violated 
nternational law by declaring the North Sea a war area, by 
extending unreasonably the lists of contraband of war, and 
by refusing to abide by the Declaration of London. The 
Declaration of London was a set of rules of naval warfare 
agreed upon by representatives of the ten leading maritime 
states at a conference held in London in the winter of 1908- 
1909. The Declaration, however, had not been ratified by all 
the countries represented at the conference and therefore did 
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not have the binding I~orce of internarlonal law, Great 
lritain was one of the powers which had not ratified the 
rinciples of the Declaration although her representatives 
.ad signed it. She refused to accept it because the restric- 
tions would bear most heavily upon her. She especially ob- 
Iected to those clauses dealing with contraband of war. 1 
The United States government felt that it could not 
accept this infringement of its rights as a neutral and so 
~rotdsted vigorously against the proposed policy in a note 
!ated February 10, 1915, It took the position that a 
belligerent's rights as to neutral ships on the high seas 
are confined to visit and search unless a blockade is pro- 
laimed and effectively maintained, The proclamat ion did 
not provide for that, so Germany had no warrant under inter- 
national law to sink an American ship. The note sounded a 
:lear note of warning to the German government, stating that 
in case American ships or lives were destroyed, the Govern- 
ment of the United States would be constrained to hold the 
Imperial German Government to a strict accounting for such 
acts of their naval authorities, 2 
A way out of the difficulty was suggested by the 
American State Department, Shortly after the "strict 
accountabilityn note was sent, Secretary Bryan in identical 
cit * 
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nores to Germany and England on February 20th suggested 
hat Germany agree to restrict her mine-laying practices 
nd submarine attacks on merchant vessels, and that Britain 
top the use of neutral flags and allow foodstuffs to go 
lnto Germany. At first both sides seemed indifferent to the 
roposal. Later, however, after the sinking of the Lusitania, 
he British Cabinet was favorably disposed toward it. How- 
.ver, when Ambassor Gerard submitted the proposal to the 
German foreign office he was informed that the German govern- 
ent would not consider it unless raw materials as well as 
food were given free access to Germany. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs also added that Germany was in no need of 
ood. 1 
The policy announced by the German foreign office 
was clearly a violation of international law. The Central 
owers were not maintaining an effective blockade of the 
British Isles, as numerous vessels came to and went from the 
British ports after the announcement of the new policy. 
Germany, therefore, did not even have the right to seize a 
neutral vessel on the high seas unless it carried a cargo of 
contraband. A belligerent did have, however, the right to 
seize enemy merchant ships and even to destroy them, pro- 
vided it was not feasiblt to bring them before a prize court. 
' ~ c ~ a s  tcr, 75 and 76. 
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here had also Deen precedent in favor of the right of a 
be1 ligerent to destroy, in extreme cases, neutral vessels 
carrying contraband; but, in all cases, no merchant vessel, 
neutral or enemy, could be destroyed until adequate pro- 
vision had been made for the safety of all persons on board. 
fiermanyls defense of her policy rested on the contention 
hat the submarine cannot be effective if international law 
is observed, and, therefore, an exception ought to be made 
f n  its favor. The American government took the position 
hat the dictates of humanity and the time-honored prin- 
ciples of international law should be upheld even at the 
cost of submarine efficiency. The fact that the submarine 
as placed at a disadvantage by virtue of England's sea 
methods did not in the least relieve Germany of the obli- 
gation to respect the right accorded to neutrals by inter- 
national law. The United States was in no way responsible 
for, nor obligated to relieve the embarrassment in which the 
submarine was placed by British practices, even if those 
practices had over-stepped the limits prescribed by inter- 
national law. 1 
Germany proceeded to act upon the policy outlined 
in her note of February 4. Beginning February 18, 1915, 
the submarine zone became effective. One after another, 
German torpedoes sent American ships to the bottom. 0x1 
4 5  
Alarch zu, 1915, the Britlsn passenger liner Falaba was sunk. 
Only one American person was lost. Then on May 1, the 
American tanker Gulfight was torpedoed and three Americans 
3st their lives. Regardless of this, American passengers 
continued to venture into the submarine zone on munitions- 
laden British liners. Secretary of State Bryan urged the 
resident to take steps to stop this practice. President 
Wilson held to his firm belief that Americans had the right 
to travel on belligerent shipso1 
These minor grievances were soon reduced to com- 
parative unimportance by the greater issue created by the 
sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915. The Lusitania had 
3de several trips across the Atlantic in defiance of the 
berman blockade. Uhen she was about to sail from New York 
on L'ay 1, 1915, an advertisement appeared in the New York 
apers over the signature of the German embassy warning 
travelers that they were at their own risk if they traveled 
by British ships in the waters around the British Isles. 
Some people heeded the warning and canceled their sailings 
at the last moment, but most of the passengers treated the 
advertisement as a Joke. The ship carried 1250 passengers 
and 667 crew. She was not armed but carried in her hold 4200 
cases of cartridges for small-arms, 1271 empty shrapnel cases, 
a small quantity of contraband, besides a large amount of 
cit 
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On 7 when the Jnlp was eight miles off Old Head 
01 nlnsale, the south coast of Ireland, she ras struck by 
two torpedoes discharged from a German submarine. In about 
lghteen minutes she went down bow first. NO warning vas 
Many of the passengers were at luncheon; but in a 
few minutes before she sank some of the passengers found 
efuge in ten life boats. The wireless operator sent call 
,fter call for help. Tugs, steam trawlers, and every 
available vessel was hurried down from Queenstown. Of the 
1,918 human beings on board, 1,153 were drowned. Of the 
188 Americans, 114 men, women and children lost their lives. 
nong them were many men well known in their walks of life. 2 
No event since the sinking of the Maine so stirred 
the country. A cry of horror and rage rose from every part 
of the country. Beyond all doubt, it was said, the destruct- 
ion of the Lusitania was carefully and deliberately planned. 
It was later found that the warning notice in the newspapers 
had been preceded by anonymous letters and telephone messages 
to many of the passengers. American citizens traveling 
peacefully had been sent to their death by the deliberately 
planned act of Emperor Vlilliam and his advisers? By the 
German language press the deed was Justified. Said one 
~ournal, "War is war. A nation forced to fight for life 
gainst a world of enemies should not be guided by sentiment. n 
he Lusitania, loaded to its capacity with explosives, 
mmunition, war material, was to the Germans a warship. To 
accept passengers under such circumstances was a crime of 
+he worst kind. Considering the cargo, some of it was liable 
expldde at the slightest shock. Therefore, it might be 
that an explosion destroyed the Lusitania. Some of the sur- 
vivors told of the asphyxiating gases. Torpedoes do not 
roduce them. 1 
There was a strong feeling, especially in the East, 
that the United States should declare war at once. Wilson 
robably could have led the country into war at that time, 
.just as Jefferson could have done a century earlier, when 
the Chesapeake was attacked by the Leopard. Wilson, how- 
ver, decided that he would not be stampeded into war. He 
wished to spare his people the horrors of war, if possible. 
Furthermore, the country was not prepared for war, either 
militarily or psychologically. In certain sections, es- 
pecially of the South and ll?est, the prevailing sentiment at 
that time was not in favor of war. A war over the Lusitania 
would probably not have had behind it the unanimous sentiment 
without which no nation should ever risk the uncertain out- 
come of armed conflict. Wilson decided to try negotiations 
l~bid -., pp. 92-93. 
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as a lllealls of upnolaing merican rights. He took a firm 
3sition in that the German government change the 
act and apologize for it; make provisions for a just in- 
demnity for the loss of herican lives; and give guarantees 
3r the future safety of American citizens on the high seas.1 
The negotiations were continued for several months 
and finally resulted in a diplomatic victory for the United 
tates. During this long period of negotiation Wilson was 
,t times the target of much hostile criticism by the advocates 
of sterner measures who complained that he was clicking the 
ypewriter when he should have been rattling the sword, 
In the course of the negotiations over the Lusitania, 
three vigorous notes of protest and warning were sent from 
the American State Department to the German foreign office. 
The first of these, prepared by Plilson with the aid of 
obert Lansing, Counselor of the State Department, was re- 
luctantly signed by Secretary Bryan. The latter felt that 
the President's policy was too aggressive and might lead to 
war. Germany, he believed, had a right to prevent contraband 
going to the Allies, and ships carrying contraband should not 
rely upon passengers to protect her from attack* He also 
wanted to submit the dispute with Germany to and 
Send note of protest to Britain before dispatching the 
second note to Germany. President k'ilson did not accept 
lcommager, OJ. G o ,  PP* 282-283* 
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these suggestions bur continued a vigorous policy toward 
Germany. His position was that if the American government 
should accept a single abatement of right many other 
humiliations would follow, and the whole international law 
ight crumble piece by piece. The second Lusitania note was 
3 strong that Bryan could not conscientiously sign it. He 
herefore resigned his post and was succeeded by Lansing. 1 
While the Lusitania case was still under discussion, 
ailuLlL=r serious case of dispute arose between Germany and 
the United States. On August 19, 1915, the Briti sh unarmed 
steamer, Arabic, was torpedoed by a German submarine near 
t~he place of the destruction of the Lusitania. It was bound 
or New York, was unarmed, carried no contraband, and was 
3unk without warning. A considerable number of the crew and 
passengers, including two Americans, lost their lives. The 
erman foreign office seemed to appreciate the seriousness 
of the situation and to fear that the American government 
would take a determined stand against this act. Consequently, 
Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador to lr!ashington, in a 
communication to Secretary Lansing in reply to his last 
Lusitania note, declared that he had been instructed to make 
for his government the pledge that German submarines would 
not in the future sink liners unless they would resist attack 
or try to escape, until adequate provision had been made for 
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tne safety 0 1  nonco~atants. This pledge, while not a 
ettlement of the Lusitania case, was an acceptance of the 
ain point contended for by Wilson and therefore made possi- 
le a more leisurely future negotiation. Later, the German 
government declared its willingness to disavow the sinking 
-f the Arabim - - A  pay indemnities for the American lives 
ost. 1 
For s i x  months the German navy observed the pledge 
"iven in the Arabic case, and during this time there was no 
erious trouble between the two governments. The first 
dangerous menace to this peaceful relation was the attack 
on the Sussex. The Sussex, an unarmed French steamer, was 
srpedoed without warning in the British Channel on March 24, 
1916, and about eighty noncombatant passengers of all ages 
and sexes, including citizens of the United States, were 
killed or injured. This act evoked a strong protest from 
President V!ilson, who regarded the attack as a plain vio- 
lation of the Arabic pledge. Secretary Lansing, with the 
President's approval, sent a stiff note to the German foreign 
office which declared that: 
Unless the Imperial German Government should not 
immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its 
present methods of submarine warfare against passenger 
and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the 
United States could have no choice but to sever diplo- 
matic relations with the German Government altogether. 
2 
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This threat of a Dreak in diplomarlc relations 
seemea ro bring the German government to a realization of 
the gravity of the situation. The German foreign minister 
was now convinced that the American government had' reached 
the limit of its patience. If a break in diplomatic re- 
lations were to be avoided he would have to agree to Wilson's 
demands. Accordingly, the German government yielded, al- 
though with very bad grace. In a note the German government 
made the following announcement: 
The German Government notifies the government of 
the United States that the German naval forces have 
received the following orders: In accordance with 
the general principles of visit and search and de- 
struction of merchant vessels recognized by inter- 
national law, such vessels, both within and without 
the area declared as a naval war zone, shall not be 
sunk without warning and without saving human lives 
unless th se ships attempt to escape or offer re- 
sistance. P 
With this pledge was coupled the statement that Ger- 
many counted on America's inducing Great Britain to observe 
the rules of international law universally recognized before 
the war, and, if the United States should fail to induce all 
the belliperents to follow the laws of humanity, Germany 
would reserve her liberty of action. The American State 
Department ignored the uply tone of the German reply and 
accepted it as a virtual compliance with its demands. The 
government was committed to a policy that might lead to war. 
m e t h e r  the United Srares would remain neutral or be dram 
ntO the would now depend upon the future conduct 
f Germany. 1 
The German government had two alternatives: one, 
to make peace; or, the other, to declare an all-out submarine 
"'arfare. Wilson then tried to use the high offices 
f the United States government to make peace. The results 
of this peace were discussed earlier in this paper. It is 
enough to say that both sides were not willing to agree to 
ny peace settlement as of yet. 
Congress was aided in making up its mind on the 
"uestion of arming American merchantmen by an important 
~ c u m e n t  which had just come into possession of the State 
uepartrnent. This was a telegram addressed to Von Eckhard, 
C-erman I.'.inister to hfexico, by Dr. Alfred Zimmermarm,who had 
ucceeded Von Jagow as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
In this telegram Dr. Zimmermann stated that G e r m n y  would 
soon resume ruthless submarine warfare and that the United 
States might in consequence be d r a m  into the war. In case 
',he United States should enter the war against *r*nys 
Eckhard was to try to form an alliance between Germany and 
Mexico. Financial support could be promised n'exicO* and she 
would be encouraged by Germany to reconquer the lost territory 
in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. This message had been In- 
tercepted by the British Naval lntellipence and to 
l ~ b f d  -. p 8  635. 
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the merican government, 1 
The Zin-mermann note was preceded by a German note 
from ~ o u n t  Von Bernstorff which stated that Germany was 
going to use all-out submarine warfare, At this the United 
ates broke off diplomatic relations with Germany but did 
not declare war on Germany as of yet, After the Zimmermann 
note, President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of 
.r and he received it, One of the reasons that Germany 
=leased an all-out submarine warfare was that they thought 
the United States might not declare war, and, if she did, 
Germany could win the war in Europe before the United States 
rould a f d  Europe, 
IV. UNIT PROCEDURES 
The following sections contain lists of reconmended 
proceaures to be used in connection with the unit. 
Initiatory activities, 
1. Have the students plan a bulletin board display of 
clippings and cartoons which illustrate important 
world problems facing the United States. Discuss 
the display with the class with questions such as 
these in mind: 
A. Are  these world problems complicated7 
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B. Are Americans domestic and foreign problems 
sometimes interrelated? 
Inat is the role of self-interest in these 
world problems? 
D. Do any public opinion polls deal with any of 
the issues involved in the display? If so, 
does the policy of the government agree with 
the opinion of the majority of those polled? 
E -  Is the United States employing its great 
power actively and intelligently in the 
solution of these problems? 
2. Have the students discuss the role of the citizen in 
the formulation of foreign policy, particularly in 
a democracy such as the United States. The follow- 
ing problems are suggested: 
A. How does the citizen exert pressure on his 
government7 
B. Discuss types of pressure groups, such as 
racial, political, labor, business, veterans. 
C. Lord Bryce observed more than sixty years ago 
that public opinion 'leads the politicians, 
not vice versa." \'.'hat does this mean? 
Give examples. 
3.  The sympathy of the American people has invariably 
gone out to democracies whenever they have become 
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in war with monarchies and aictatorships. 
Give The first three chapters in the 
in the Street by Thomas A. Bailey are helpful. --- 
4* Point out that recent polls have shown that as one 
goes lower in the educational system one finds 
more jingoism, more militarism, more provincialism, 
more isolationism, more indifference to foreign 
affairs, more race prejudice, and more reluctance 
to pay public servants adequate salaries. Ask 
the students how they and the school can more 
effectively accept their responsibility in this 
tremendous job of public education which needs to 
be done. 
5. Comment on special sources of information helpful to 
students of international affairs. The !Yorld 
Affairs Center of the University of Iowa has a 
large sup?ly of free or inexpensive pamphlets on 
current world problems. Make a display of such 
materials. 
6. In our thinking we should learn to put ourselves in 
the other fellow's shoes, and to view a problem as 
he would see it through the lenses of his racial 
psychology and national bias. !\rith this in mind, 
invite a foreign student from one of the 
colleges to talk to the class* 
Ine ilm, "World VJar I: Ihe Background", or the 
"The Rise of America as a VJorld Leadern, 
may be used as an introductory film, 
film, " ~ ~ o r l d  VJalar I", may be shown to the class 
stimulate interest for the study of the unit. 
Developmental activities. 
On a Mercator projection, show the class the 
parent distances which separate the United 
btates east coast from Europe and its west coast 
from Asia. Note also the size of Greenland as 
mpared with South America. Chalk these re- 
lationships on a globe. Have the class draw 
conclusions as to how the widespread use of the 
Yercator maps of the world in American schools 
may have fostered isolationist sentiment. 
Have a student make a careful study of American 
history during the period of the Articles of 
Confederation, noting especial ly the reasons 
why the central government was unable to prevent 
strife between states. Then have the class draw 
conclusions which might be relevant to the  rob- 
lems of m r l d  government, particularly in its 
to prevent strife between nations* 
Have students prepare a Dictionary of Terms 
to diplomatic history, including such 
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expressio~ls as persona non grata, dollar diplomacy, 
status - ante bellum, and recognition. 
4. Ask a student to imagine that he is a member of 
Congress in 1898. One of his fellow representatives 
has made a speech urging a declaration of war on 
Spain. The student should prepare and give to 
the class a reply opposing the declaration. 
5. Differences between countries are usually settled by 
(a) war, (b) negotiation, (3) arbitration, or 
(d) submission of grievances to a recognized 
international body, Using these headings, have 
students prepare a chart summarizing the major 
international differences since 1898 to 1917 to 
which the United States was a party, 
6. Panel topic: Was the United States justified in 
going to war against Germany in 19171 
7.  Using parallel columns, a student should compare the 
positions of the United States, England, France, 
and Germany in the years 1914-1917 with the position 
of each regarding the rights and duties of neutral 
nations, 
8 .  The class as a group should try to define Kanifest 
Destiny. 
9. On a blackboard map of the United States ask a 
student to show the acquisitions of territory 
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Derween 1003-1898. He should indicate by different 
types of shading how the territory was acquired- 
that is, by purchase, by negotiation, or by force. 
A timeline might properly accompany the map. Then 
the class might concern itself with this question: 
Was the spread of the United States westward to the 
Pacific Ocean and Caribbean region an example of 
imperialism? 
1u. nave a student show in some graphic way the importance 
of the Panama Canal to America and to world trade. 
11. where possible, some student should consult a news- 
paper file to obtain a vivid impression of the in- 
tense feeling in the United States over the Cuban 
situation in 1898. 
iz. AS an American newspaper correspondent in Cuba in 
leg?, some student might write a special article 
describing the Spanish cruelties under the recon- 
centration policy. 
13. Pane1 topic: Was the United States justified in going 
to war against Spain in 18987 Arguments m y  be 
given by an imperialist, an anti-imperialist, and a 
humanitar fan. 
14. Panel topic: Straits and canals of great strategic 
importance should be under international control. 
15. Town meeting topic: Should the United States be 
proud of its record as a colonial administrator? 
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Have student "experts" present the arguments for 
and against the United States in Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico, and the Philippines. After these presen- 
tations, the whole class should be brought into 
the discussion. 
10. Have the class discuss this question: In what ways 
was the Open Door Policy for the Far East differ- 
ent from the Monroe Doctrine for the Western 
Hemisphere? 
17. Have a student make a timeline for the events from 
June 28, 1914 to April 6, 1917. He should place 
asterisks before those events which he believes 
contributed to America's declaration of war. He 
should defend his point of view before the class. 
I F .  Have a student draw a diagram to show the organi- 
zation of the State Department. Have another 
student draw a diagram showing how the various 
branches of America's national government influence 
foreign policy. A study of these diagrams will 
reveal a number of problems which might well 
involve the class in serious discussion. Would 
it be better to have treaties ratified by an abso- 
lute maJority of both houses rather than by two- 
thirds maJorlty of the Senate7 Should the Presi- 
dent be allowed to veto items in a bill without 
reJecting it completely7 Should the Secretary of 
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State be permitted LO make personal appearances 
fore Congress to answer questions that had been 
p~.evious ly submitted? 
Culminating activities, 
1. In the light of this Unitrs study, discuss in class 
these points of view: 
Self-interest is the basis of all foreign 
policies. 
0,  Physical force is the final determinant in 
diplomacy. 
Power imposes responsibilities. 
D, Diplomacy requires the services of our ablest 
men. 
2. Have the class summarize the history of American 
diplomacy under the following headings: 
A. The influences which have shaped our foreign 
policy between the years 1889-1317. 
B. The specific fundamental foreign policies of 
the United States which developed between 
189e-1917. 
C. Foreign policy in the future. 
3 .  Students may wish to prepare a letter on some aspect 
of foreign policy to be sent to their congressmen 
or senator, 
4.  Give the class a test on understandings developed in 
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this unit. In addition, evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of the unit with the students. 
The following films and filmstrips may be shown to 
summarize this unit: (1) "World War I", (2) "In- 
ternational Responsibility", (3) "World Power 
~esponsibility", (4) "The New Freedom and World 
Vlar I". 
V. MATERIALS TO BE USED 
I-he materials listed in the following sections are 
for use with the proposed unit. 
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Audio-visual Materials. 
Films 
_I_ 
Public Opinion in a Democracy (Sound, 10 minutes, 
-- 
Lulor or black and white). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, 
Chicago 1, Illinois. This film shows the power of public 
opinion f n the United States. 
Causes and - Immediate Effects of the First Vlorld Kar -----
(Sound, 23 mi nutes, black and white). International Geo- 
craphic Pictures, 1776 Broadway, New York 19, New York. 
Panama (sound, 16 minutes, black and white). Mc- 
*ar-}li 11 Book Company, Textbook Film Dcpartmnt, 330 West 
42nd Street, New York 18, New York. This film shows the 
progress of the Canal over the years. 
Panama Canal (Sound, 15 minutes, black and white). 
General Electric Company, Electronics Division, Syracuse, 
New York. This film tells about t h e  building of the Panama 
Cana 1. 
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WJ t0 the Far East (lL minutes, - 
---3-- 
black and white). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, chicago 
19 Illinois. This film shows the past history, present 
activities and direction of the future growth of the philip- 
pines, 
United States Expansion ~ve. ,,. 1898-1917 (13+ 
minutes, color). Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, 
I llinois. This film reviews United States expansion into 
the Hawaiian Islands, Cuba, Philippines and countries of 
Central Americ 
Imperial r sm - and European Expansion (1312 minutes, 
color). Coronet Fi lms, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, 
Illinois. Nationalism, industrial rivalry, technological 
prooress, search for cheap raw materials and missionary 
activities are shown as they affected the character of the 
im~er la 1 expans ion movement of 1875-1914. 
. - -  1 .  I : - The Background (133 minutes, color) 
Coronet Fi lrns, Coronet Buf lding, Chicago 1, Illinois* This 
f i lm reviews the basic causes and f nternational incidents 
which l e d  to w a r ,  with particular attention given to the 
Balknn conflict, 
\~!~~ld war I ( 2 8  minutes, black and white)- Ency- 
- -  
clopcdia Britannica Films, Inca, "'ilmette. Illinoiso This 
film is a documentnrv of the role of the United 
Admiral Dewey's Victory h'anila (26 minutes' 
black and whitc ) . h k G r r w  Hf 11, Text-Fi Department' 
67 
33" West 4Znd Street, New York 36, New York. This film shows 
the naval victory at Manila Bay and the occupation of the 
city itself. 
Ye1 low - Jack (29 minutes, black and white). Teaching 
~1 l m  Custodians, Inc., 25 '!Jest 43rd Street, New York 63, New 
Yorka This film tells of *-he fight against disease in the 
spanish-American War. 
Film Strips 
-
The Rist of America as a World Leader. 
--- --- 
Yale Univer- 
sity rress, Film Service, 386 4th Avenue, New York 16, New 
Yorl 
Woodrow ! v i  lson. Pictorial Events, 597 5th Avenue, 
New York 17, New York. 
International Responsibi lity. (1900-1912). Society 
1 or Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Civersey Parlnay, Chicaao 14, 
Illinois. 
'L'orld Power Responsibility. (1876-1900). Society 
for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey P a r m y ,  Chicago 
The -- New Freedom ---- and World War I (1913-1918). 
Society for Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diverse~ Parmy, 
Chicaqo 14, Illinois. 
America as a \iJ~rld Power Before 1918. Society for 
Visual Education, Inc., 1345 Diversey P a r m y ,  Chicago 14, 
Illinois. 
VI. E V A L ~ A - 1 . 1 ~ ~  THE UNIT 
m e r e  is no Part of the teaching process more sensi- 
tive rnan testing. If a test calls for factual informtian 
it shows that teachers are putting emphasis on factual in- 
formation which they hope will be retained by the students 
until the examination. 
If the objectives--understandings, skills and 
abi l i  ties, etc.--are stated concisely and specifically 
enough a teacher cannot be guilty of failing to test for 
these objectives. 
It must be decided what the test is to accomplish. 
It is believed much emphasis has been given to one out of 
four purDoses. Four basic purposes of tests are: 
1. To measure the effectiveness of what is taught. 
To tell the teacher how well he is dealina with 
the students. 
2. TO increase the impact of instruction on the sta- 
dents. 
3 .  To aid what is tauaht and how it is taught. It 
is also a check on good teaching. If students 
do poorly, the way ideas are presented may be at 
fault, or concepts may be too difficult. 
4 .  TO r ~ n k  students according to achievement. This is 
very important, but it 1s not the only Purpose. 
FO 1 lowing are suggest ions for evaluation proceaures. 
Essay Test. Discuss the following questions, usin< 
facts to back up generalization: 
1. Why was the United States involved in the Cuban 
situation of 18987 
2. What was the Spanish-American War- 
3. \!%at effects did the Spanish-American War have7 
4. \{%at were the United States methods of imperialism? 
5. What were the United States views towards Latin 
America? 
6. \{%at was the United States stand in Eastern affairs? 
7. \$%at events forced the United States into war with 
the Axis Powers? 
Fane1 Liscussions. Panel discussions are one way 
in which the stydentsf attitude and ideas m y  be expressed. 
S o m ~  possible tonics for a panel discussion are: 
1. Should the United States have entered World B!ar I? 
2 .  E v ~ r y  country in the world must have democracy in 
order for the people to be content. 
3. \+'as the United States Justified in going to war 
aqainst Spain in 18987 
4. Straits and canals of great strategic importance 
should be under international control. 
Oral -Exsmination. PY observation in class it is 
poSSible to determine whether the students have developed a 
7 
70 
, able attitude towards democracy. It is also possibl 
tell by class  response the extent to which students ktlou 
the material and understand it. This can be reflected in 
class discussion and general attitude of the students. 
CHAPTER I11 
SUMMARY 
The PUrPose of this study was ro aevelop a resource 
unit for the teaching of the development of the United States 
diplomatic relations from the Spanish-American War to the 
entrance of the United States into World War 1, for use by 
the high school history teacher. 
The resource unit was selected as the basis for 
organization so the American history teacher could be pro- 
vided with various sources of available materials for the 
planning of his own teaching units. 
n the gathering and organization of materials 
d e a l  i na v l i  th l l n i  ted States international relations, high 
schcol hcrican historv textbooks were first surveyed. It 
was found that these in aeneral gave incomplete treatment 
of this a r e a .  This necessitated the use of college texts 
to prcspnt a more adequate treatrrent of the selected his- 
torical problem. 
The unit has been presented in Chapter 11. The 
fol lowinq outline was used. 
1. Overview of the unit 
11. ObJsctives to be souaht from the unit 
111. Contents of the unit 
IV. Unit procedures 
A, lnitiatory activities 
B Developmental activities 
C, Culminating activities 
V, Materials to be used 
A, Reading materials 
1. Bibliography for the teacher 
2, Bibliography for the students 
B,  Audio-visual naterials 
VI, Evaluating the unit 
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